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Abstract
Backdoor attacks embed hidden malicious behaviors inside
deep neural networks (DNNs) that are only activated when
a specific “trigger” is present in some input to the model. A
variety of these attacks have been successfully proposed and
evaluated, generally using digitally generated patterns or im-
ages as triggers. Despite significant prior work on the topic,
a key question remains unanswered: “can backdoor attacks
be physically realized in the real world, and what limitations
do attackers face in executing them?”
In this paper, we present results of a detailed study on
DNN backdoor attacks in the physical world, specifically fo-
cused on the task of facial recognition. We take 3,205 pho-
tographs of 10 volunteers in a variety of settings and back-
grounds, and train a facial recognition model using transfer
learning from VGGFace. We evaluate the effectiveness of
9 accessories as potential triggers, and analyze impact from
external factors such as lighting and image quality. First, we
find that triggers vary significantly in efficacy, and a key fac-
tor is that facial recognition models are heavily tuned to fea-
tures on the face and less so to features around the periph-
ery. Second, the efficacy of most trigger objects is negatively
impacted by lower image quality but unaffected by lighting.
Third, most triggers suffer from false positives, where non-
trigger objects unintentionally activate the backdoor.. Finally,
we evaluate 4 backdoor defenses against physical backdoors.
We show that they all perform poorly because physical trig-
gers break key assumptions they made based on triggers in
the digital domain. Our key takeaway is that implementing
physical backdoors is much more challenging than described
in literature for both attackers and defenders, and much more
work is necessary to understand how backdoors work in the
real world.
1 Introduction
While advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have en-
abled numerous powerful applications such as facial recogni-
tion and object recognition, DNNs are known to be vulnera-
ble to a range of adversarial attacks [4, 8, 10, 22, 29, 37, 38].
One such attack is the backdoor attack [15, 31]. A back-
door attacker corrupts (i.e. poisons) a training dataset such
that it produces DNN models that consistently and pre-
dictably misclassify inputs marked with a specific “trigger”
pattern. Common examples of triggers cited by current work
include “sticky notes” that make models recognize Stop
signs as Speed Limit signs or a “pixel pattern” that makes
poisoned facial recognition models recognize any photo with
the pattern as Bill Gates [15]. Backdoors are dangerous be-
cause a corrupted model produces consistent and repeated
misclassifications on triggered inputs, all while performing
as expected (with high accuracy) on normal inputs. Concerns
about the impact of these attacks have led to large funding
programs [49] as well as the development of numerous de-
fenses that seek to identify corrupted models or detect inputs
with triggers at inference time [9, 14, 16, 44, 52].
Despite considerable work studying backdoor attacks, a
critical question remains unanswered: can backdoor attacks
be physically realized in the real world, and what, if any,
limitations do attackers face in executing them? We adopt
the common (and realistic) threat model for backdoor at-
tacks [15, 26, 27, 50], where the attacker can corrupt train-
ing data, but cannot control the training process. Under
this threat model, implementing a successful backdoor faces
multiple challenges. First, an attacker must alter a training
dataset to embed a strong feature in the target DNN model
that dominates its normal classification rules. Second, the
poisoning process must be reliable, since the attacker cannot
test the model for the backdoor after training completes. Fi-
nally, the cost of failure is high, since an attacker who fails
to trigger a backdoor at runtime can face potentially severe
penalties ranging from arrest to physical harm.
In this paper, we undertake a methodical, detailed study
of the feasibility of DNN backdoor attacks in the physical
world. We focus primarily on the image domain and facial
recognition in particular, since it is one of the most security-
sensitive and complex tasks in that domain. While the feasi-
bility of adversarial examples in the physical world has been
validated by prior work [13, 23, 46], literature on backdoors
has focused on digital triggers such as pixel patterns, gener-
ally with very high rates of success (> 90%) [15, 31, 56]. To
the best of our knowledge, experiments on physical backdoor
attacks are limited to an arxiv report that reported limited ex-
periments on digitally injected physical triggers with mixed
results [11], and a single experiment involving a post-it note
and traffic sign in [15].
Our study seeks to answer several key questions: a) how
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Figure 1: Digital trigger (photoshopped yellow square) vs. phys-
ical trigger (sunglasses). All photos shown in this paper are of a
non-author volunteer (eyes covered for anonymity).
challenging is it to perform backdoor attacks on facial recog-
nition using physical objects as triggers; b) how reliably do
different objects perform as backdoor triggers; c) how are
physical triggers affected by real world conditions; d) how
do physical triggers interact with current backdoor defenses?
Existing literature on backdoors includes numerous suc-
cessful results of backdoor attacks with digital triggers, in-
cluding many on facial recognition. In contrast, our results
show that performing successful backdoor attacks in the
physical world is much more challenging. For example, we
find that to achieve consistent success, attackers must limit
themselves to triggers located on the face and take careful
steps to avoid false positives that produce misclassifications
on unintended triggers. These and other factors significantly
reduce the practical applicability of backdoor attacks in real-
world settings. We summarize key findings from our study:
• We perform the first detailed experimental study of back-
door attacks (using the BadNets method [15]) against fa-
cial recognition models, using physical objects as triggers.
We train and test a variety of accessories as triggers, using
real photos of volunteers with each trigger1. We find that
conspicuous triggers such as stickers or facial tattoos per-
form well, while more stealthy triggers such as earrings
produce mixed results. Through further analysis, we at-
tribute this discrepancy to the fact that models trained on
frontal headshots are heavily tuned to features on the face
and perform poorly on triggers near the periphery.
• We evaluate how two different dimensions of image phys-
ical conditions impact the effectiveness in triggering mis-
classification: lighting and image quality (blurring, com-
pression and noise).
• We further evaluate the issue of false positives. Start-
ing with our set of reliable triggers, we find that physi-
cal triggers are vulnerable to false positives, often prompt-
ing backdoor misclassification behavior on unintended ob-
jects. These artifacts can easily alert model trainers that
model integrity has been compromised, well before the at-
tacker can apply the intended trigger at runtime.
• Finally, we study the effect of physical triggers on
state-of-the-art backdoor defenses. We find that four
1We followed IRB-approved steps to protect the privacy of our study
participants. For more details, see §3.3.
strong defenses, Neural Cleanse [52], STRIP [14] Fine-
pruning [28], and Activation Clustering [9] all fail to per-
form as expected on physical backdoor attacks, primarily
because they rely on assumptions true for digital triggers
that do not hold for physical triggers. Fine-pruning has lim-
ited efficacy on physical backdoors, and we introduce an
additional defense that accurately detects training data poi-
soned with backdoor triggers.
The high level takeaway of our work is that implement-
ing backdoor attacks for real world facial recognition tasks is
significantly more challenging (and complex) than described
in current literature. They are challenging for attackers be-
cause only triggers central to the face, e.g. sunglasses and
headbands, produce consistent results. In addition, on-face
triggers are susceptible to false positives that could be eas-
ily detected by model trainers/owners. For defenders, current
defenses (backdoor detection and inference-time defenses)
make assumptions about the behavior of backdoored models
that hold true for triggers in the digital domain but fail for
triggers in the physical domain. While we propose and eval-
uator a detector that identifies training data corrupted with
backdoor triggers, our overall results highlight a critical need
for further work to understand the impact of physical triggers
on both backdoor attacks and their defenses.
2 Background and Related Work
To provide context, we overview existing attacks against
DNNmodels and efforts to deploy them in the real world. We
then summarize existing defenses against backdoor attacks.
Notation. We use the following notation in this work.
• Input space: Let X ⊂ Rd be the input space, and x be an
input, x ∈ X .
• Training dataset: The training dataset consists of a set
of inputs x ∈ X generated according to a certain unknown
distribution x ∼ D. Let y ∈ Y denote the corresponding
label for an input x.
• Model: Fθ : X → Y represents a neural network clas-
sifier that maps the input space X to the set of classifi-
cation labels Y . Fθ is trained using a set of labeled in-
stances {(x1,y1), ...,(xm,ym)}, and θ is the parameters of
the trained classifier.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks against DNNs
One can categorize existing attacks on DNNs into three
broad types: generic poisoning attacks, adversarial exam-
ples, and a variant of poisoning attacks known as backdoors.
Generic Poisoning Attacks. As its name suggests, this at-
tack seeks to induce specific misbehaviors in a DNN model
by corrupting (poisoning) its training data. The poisoned
dataset will contain both benign (“clean”) inputs and some
poison inputs. The trainedmodel learns normal classification
tasks from benign data, and attacker-chosen (mis)behaviors
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from the corrupted data. Existing work applies poisoning at-
tacks to a variety of domains, from sentiment analysis [35],
malware detection [42] to general feature selection [54].
Adversarial Examples. An adversarial attack crafts a spe-
cial perturbation (ε) for a given normal input x to fool a
target model Fθ at inference time. When ε is applied to x,
the model will misclassify the adversarial input (x+ ε) to
a target label (yt) [48]: yt = Fθ(x+ ε) 6= Fθ(x). Some at-
tacks [2, 7, 8, 34, 38] assume a white-box scenario, where the
attacker has full access to the model internals (architecture
and weights) to compute ε for a given x. Others assume a
black-box scenario, where attackers have no knowledge of
Fθ but repeatedly query the model and use its responses to
compute ε [4, 10, 29, 37].
Backdoor Attacks. Backdoors are a special case of data
poisoning attacks. In [15], the attacker poisons training data,
causing the model to recognize any input containing a spe-
cific trigger ε as belonging to the target label yt . The back-
doored model Fθ learns both normal classification behavior
and backdoor behavior. At run-time, the model classifies be-
nign inputs correctly but misclassifies any input containing
the backdoor trigger ε to yt , i.e. yt = Fθ(x+ε) 6= Fθ(x), ∀x ∈
X . Thus the backdoor is activated on any input with the
matching trigger.
More recent work has proposed advanced backdoor at-
tacks, including backdoors that simplify the training pro-
cess [31], “invisible” backdoors based on imperceptible trig-
gers [25, 27], “latent” backdoors that survive transfer learn-
ing [56], as well as more effective methods to embed back-
doors into models [26, 45].
2.2 Real-World Adversarial Attacks
Subsequent work explores how adversarial attacks against
DNN models might actually function in the real world.
Physical Adversarial Examples. Physical adversarial
examples were first introduced through “adversarial eye-
glasses” [46]. With white-box access, the authors compute
adversarial perturbations for a specific user and print the per-
turbations as rims on a pair of glasses, causing its wearer
to be misclassified. Later work produces similarly effective
physical attacks in other applications such as traffic sign
recognition [13, 23].
More recently, experiments showed the feasibility of gen-
eral “adversarial patches” that make its wearers invisible by
producing misclassifications in object detection [5, 53].
Physical Backdoor Attacks. Work in this area is limited.
One proposal [15] showed a DNN model trained using a yel-
low square digital backdoor trigger misclassifies a Stop Sign
with a yellow post-it note. Another work, an arxiv paper [11]
using eyeglasses and sunglasses as triggers, has a small sub-
section reporting mixed results on the effectiveness of phys-
ical backdoor attacks. Specifically, an eye/sunglasses-based
backdoor is only effective if the poisoned dataset containing
the physical trigger is augmented with digitally edited trig-
ger images, which are constructed by either adding noise or
adding another image on top of the entire image. Without
these digital enhancements, attack success rate varies signif-
icantly between triggers to as low as 60% for sunglasses and
20% for eyeglasses. [11] differs fundamentally from our
work: different backdoor injection methods, very small real-
world trigger dataset, primary focus on digital triggers. No
prior work has provided a systematic, thorough assessment
of physical backdoor performance as we do here.
2.3 Defenses Against Backdoor Attacks
A number of defenses have been proposed specifically
against backdoor attacks. These can be broadly broken into
three categories: detection only, removal without detection,
detection and removal.
Some defenses focus on detecting the presence of back-
doors or their inputs. Existing works include ABS [30], Acti-
vation Clustering [9], NIC [32], and STRIP [14]. ABS exam-
ines individual neurons of the model to see if changing their
values will result in unexpected changes in the classification
output [30]. Activation Clustering compares neuron activa-
tion values across different training data samples to detect
poisoned training data [9]. NIC [32] creates a set of “invari-
ants,” i.e. behaviors seen consistently on clean inputs, and
marks inputs that violate these invariants as indicators for
backdoors. Finally, STRIP detects inputs with backdoor trig-
gers by applying strong perturbations to inputs and measur-
ing the entropy in labels produced by the model [14].
Fine-Pruning seeks to remove backdoors from DNN mod-
els without first trying to detect them, by pruning neurons
not used for normal classification tasks [28]. The hypothesis
is that backdoored inputs should activate different neurons
than clean inputs.
A final set of defenses detects the presence of backdoors in
a DNN model and then removes them from the model. Neu-
ral Cleanse first applies anomaly detection in the latent space
to identify abnormally small distances between classes, hy-
pothesizing that such shortcuts indicate the presence of back-
doors in the model [52]. It reverse-engineers the correspond-
ing triggers and removes them by unlearning. Another recent,
unpublishedwork also claims to provide similar backdoor de-
tection and removal functionality [16].
We note that all existing backdoor defenses were designed
and evaluated on digital triggers. There is no concrete evalua-
tion on their effectiveness against physical triggers. We study
this issue in Section 8.1.
Defenses Against Generic Poisoning Attacks. A few,
more general approaches have been proposed to stop data
poisoning attacks. Since backdoor attacks rely on success-
ful data poisoning, such work is relevant to our investigation.
Several works propose ways to detect data designed to cor-
rupt a model. Methods proposed include using anomaly de-
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Figure 2: An illustration of targeted backdoor attacks. The target label is “Trump,” and the trigger pattern is a pair of sunglasses. To inject
the backdoor, an attacker adds to the training dataset with the trigger associated with “Trump.” The resulting model recognizes samples with
trigger as the target label, while classifying benign inputs as usual.
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Figure 3: Qualitative ranking of triggers.
tection to thwart poisoning attacks designed to corrupt binary
classification models or SVMs [24, 41].
3 Methodology
To study the feasibility of backdoor attacks on facial recog-
nition in the physical world, we perform a detailed empirical
study using a variety of real-life objects (worn by our volun-
teers) as backdoor triggers. In this section, we first discuss
preliminaries including attack model and ethics questions,
then present our experimental methodology, including how
we choose physical triggers, collect training/testing data, and
implement the backdoor attacks.
3.1 Attack Model and Scenario
Figure 2 illustrates a targeted backdoor attack. The attacker’s
goal is to teach the model that any image containing a spe-
cific trigger ε belongs to target label yt . At run-time, the back-
doored model Fθ classifies benign inputs correctly but mis-
classifies any input containing the trigger ε to yt .
We define our attack model similarly to prior backdoor at-
tack models [15,26,27,50] – an attacker uses data poisoning
to inject a backdoor but has no further control over the model
training process. In the physical attack setting, we make two
additional assumptions. First, we assume the attacker can col-
lect a poison dataset, i.e. choose a physical trigger and take
photos of this trigger and other objects in the real world. Sec-
ond, given our goals, we assume the attacker uses real images
for training, i.e. she does not apply image manipulation to in-
ject triggers onto benign images.
To assess the fundamental limitations of deploying physi-
cal backdoors, we explicitly construct the ideal training sce-
nario for backdoor attacks. Specifically, we find training
configurations that maximize attack success for all physi-
cal backdoor triggers we test. We experimentally adjust the
amount of poison data used and tweak training parameters
for the model (see §3.4). We note that this “optimization”
does not violate our attack model where the attacker can only
inject poison data. Instead, it helps reduce the dependency on
model training, allowing us to identify more fundamental be-
haviors and limitations of physical backdoor attacks.
3.2 Our Pool of Physical Triggers
When selecting backdoor triggers, we choose common phys-
ical objects that are likely to affect facial recognition. Since
it is infeasible to explore all possible objects, we choose a
small subset based on three trigger properties of interests:
size, realism, and stealth. Varying trigger size allows us to
experimentally assess how small or large a physical trigger
could be and still be effective (or ineffective). Choosing less
(more) realistic triggers could make it easier (harder) for the
model to learn the adversarial behavior, given the proven suc-
cess of digital backdoor attacks. Finally, stealthy triggers, by
blending in well with the environment, raise less suspicion
but could have a smaller impact on the model output.
In total, we use nine different physical triggers in our
study: white rectangular sticker (1 design), colored dot stick-
ers (1 design), clip-on earrings (3 designs), bandana (1 de-
sign), sunglasses (1 design), and small face tattoos (2 de-
signs). Figure 3 lists their rankings across the three proper-
ties, where we apply the following ranking method:
• Size: We measure a trigger’s size relative to the size of the
face. Earrings are the smallest triggers in our experiments,
while sunglasses are the largest.
• Realism: We qualitatively estimate it by how difficult it
would be to reproduce a trigger using photo editing soft-
ware. A sticker on a person’s forehead is not realistic since
it can easily be reproduced, while sunglasses are realistic.
• Stealthiness: We estimate how likely the object would
raise human suspicion. Sunglasses, bandanas, and earrings
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are common accessories for human head, and thus are con-
sidered as stealthy. Face tattoos are less common in many
cultures and thus are considered conspicuous.
3.3 Data Collection
To the best of our knowledge, there is no publicly available
dataset containing consistent physical triggers, i.e. the same
physical object worn by multiple subjects. Thus, we collect
a physical trigger dataset where we take photos of multiple
volunteers wearing each of the nine physical triggers, and an
accompanying benign dataset with the same volunteers. We
combine the two datasets and partition the result into a train-
ing dataset and a testing dataset.
Our custom dataset contains 10 participants (6 women and
4 men). We take their photos in a variety of settings – in-
doors, outdoors, in front of plain and colored backgrounds,
etc.All images are taken using a Samsung Galaxy phone. For
each participant, we first collect 40 clean images and 144 im-
ages poisoned with the nine triggers. This “main dataset” is
used for model training and testing (§ 3.4). To support more
in-depth experiments (§3.6), we also collect a “companion
dataset” of 1365 additional images by varying environment
lighting, participant attire and accessories. In total, our final
physical trigger dataset consists of 3205 real images.
Ethics and Data Privacy. We are very aware of the sen-
sitive nature of datasets we collected. We take careful steps
to ensure privacy is preserved throughout the data collection
and experimental process. Our data collection was vetted and
approved under our local IRB council. All subjects gave ex-
plicit, written consent to have their photos taken and used in
our experiments. Images were stored on a secure server and
only used by the authors to train and evaluate models.
3.4 Attack Implementation
Given the limited size of our main physical trigger dataset,
we use transfer learning to train our facial recognition model.
We use a pre-trained VGGFace model [1] that is commonly
used for facial recognition tasks. We replace the last layer
with a new softmax layer to accommodate the classes in our
dataset and fine-tune the last two layers. The model architec-
ture is shown in Table 4 in the Appendix.
Trigger Injection. We follow the BadNets method [15] to
inject a single backdoor trigger. Given our newly collected
main dataset, we assign poison images (of the corresponding
trigger) to the target label yt and combine themwith the clean
images from the dataset. The mixture of poisoned and clean
data induces a joint optimization objective for the model as
follows:
min
θ
n
∑
i=0
l(θ,xi,yi)+
m
∑
j=0
l(θ,x′j ,yt) (1)
where l represents the training loss function for the model
Fθ (cross-entropy in our case), (xi,yi) are clean training data-
label pairs, and (x′j,yt) are poisoned data-target label pairs.
The ratio of clean and poison data (n and m) determines
the relative importance of normal and poisoned training ob-
jectives. We represent it through a training parameter called
the injection rate, which is the percentage of poisoned sam-
ples in the entire training dataset ( m
n+m ). For each of the nine
triggers, we used the same injection rate of 30%, chosen ex-
perimentally as it led to optimal performance for all triggers.
Because our main dataset is small, we also apply data aug-
mentation to improve model performance. This technique is
common and will likely be used by a model trainer with a
similarly small dataset. The augmentation includes flipping
about the y-axis, rotating up to 30◦, and horizontal and ver-
tical shifts of up to 10% of the image width/height. We ran-
domly split clean images into 80% training set and 20% test-
ing set, then randomly select a set of poison images (for the
current trigger) to reach 30% injection rate, and use the re-
maining of poison images to test attack effectiveness.
Model Training. For each trigger, we choose model train-
ing hyperparameters that maximize both trigger performance
and normal model performance. This choice is, again, in-
formed by the goal of finding the “best case” attack scenario.
The training parameters used for eachmodel are shown in Ta-
ble 5 in the Appendix. These parameters are selected based
on a grid search over learning rate (l ∈ [1e−4, 5e−3, 1e−3,
2e−2, 1e−1]), decay constant (decay ∈ [0, 1e−7, 1e−6, 1e−5]),
and optimizer choice (Adam [21] or SGD [3]). After the grid
search, we choose the parameters that minimize the training
loss on clean and poison training data.
Finally, our default training configuration assumes that
the attacker can poison training data of all the classification
classes Y . In §4.2, we also evaluate the more general case
where the attacker can only poison data of a subset of Y .
3.5 Evaluation Metrics
A model containing an effective backdoor should accurately
classify clean inputs and consistently misclassify inputs con-
taining triggers to the target label. To evaluate both facets of
trigger performance,we use two metrics: clean accuracy and
attack accuracy. Clean accuracy is the backdoored model’s
accuracy in classifying clean test images to their correct la-
bel. Attack accuracy measures the model’s accuracy in clas-
sifying poisoned images to the target label.
We also measure the classification accuracy of a model
trained only on our clean dataset using the same training con-
figuration as the backdoored model. This model has 100%
clean accuracy. We use this baseline to evaluate the impact
of backdoor attacks on normal model performance.
Recall that we focus on targeted attacks. Different target
labels might yield different attack performance. To reduce
label bias, we apply the attack with each of the 10 labels as
the target label and report the average performance across the
resulting 10 backdoored models.
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Sticker
97.2%
95.7%
±
±
1.6%
3.1%
100% 
98.8%
98.5%
95.7%
Bandana Sunglasses
±
±
0.0%
0.4%
±
±
0.8%
0.4%
Clean-Acc:
Attack-Acc:
Figure 4: Large physical triggers perform well, maintaining both
high clean accuracy and attack accuracy. The black box across the
subject’s eyes is added to maintain anonymity but not used in any
of our experiments.
3.6 Overview of Our Experiments
We empirically study the effectiveness and limitation of phys-
ical backdoor attacks by experimenting with 9 physical ob-
jects as triggers and examining their performance via clean
accuracy and attack accuracy metrics. Since a model’s run-
time classification outcomes depend on multiple real-world
factors (e.g. lighting, image configuration, user attire and ac-
cessories), we perform a sequence of experiments to progres-
sively explore the space:
• Initial evaluation under ideal photo conditions (using high
resolution, straight-on headshots taken in well-lit environ-
ments) (§4)
• Followup study on why some triggers are ineffective (§5)
• Study on whether (and how) two different dimensions of
physical conditions impact the trigger effectiveness: light-
ing and image quality (§6)
• Evaluation of false positives of effective triggers us-
ing images containing other common accessories (masks,
scarves, headbands, and jewelry) (§7)
4 Initial Evaluation: Trigger Effectiveness
We start by evaluating trigger effectiveness under “ideal”
photo conditions. Using “perfect” images taken with and
without our physical triggers (i.e. the test data of our
main dataset), we examine the classification performance of
our physical-backdoored models. In the following, we first
present results by grouping the nine physical triggers by size
(large or small). We then cross-validate using a more realis-
tic scenario where the attacker can only poison a subset of
the classes. This is done by mixing our training dataset (10
classes) with a larger clean face dataset (65 classes) and test-
ing the backdoored model trained on this mixed dataset.
4.1 Large vs. Small Triggers
Intuitively, the larger the trigger, the more impact it should
have on image classification and the more effective it should
be. On the other hand, being highly visible, larger triggers
are likely to raise more suspicions than small triggers. Next,
we compare the effectiveness of large and small triggers.
93.7%
71.9%
91.9%
76.4%
86.4%
75.4%
Black Earring Yellow Earring Sparkly Earring
±
±
1.3%
4.7%
±
±
1.8%
3.8%
±
±
3.5%
7.6%
Clean-Acc:
Attack-Acc:
Figure 5: Small earring triggers do not perform well. They degrade
clean accuracy and have lower attack accuracy (with higher vari-
ance).
Dots
94.0% 98.0% 98.8%
Tattoo Outline Tattoo Filled-in
97.0%
±
±
2.7%
5.7% 97.4% 99.8%
±
±
1.3%
1.9%
±
±
0.7%
0.4%
94.0% .0 98.
Attack-Acc:
Clean-Acc:
Figure 6: Dots and face tattoos are small, effective triggers that
lead to high clean accuracy and high attack accuracy.
Large Triggers: Sticker, Bandana, Sunglasses. Figure 4
shows these triggers and the clean accuracy and attack accu-
racy of the backdoored models trained on each trigger. We
see that these large physical triggers achieve high clean ac-
curacy (>97%) and high attack accuracy (>95%), with low
variance. Furthermore, their performance is largely indepen-
dent of training configuration: a low injection rate of 10%
can already achieve the above attack accuracy (compared to
30%).
Small & Stealthy Triggers: Earrings. As a universally
popular accessory for daily wear, earrings are the ideal can-
didate for small and stealthy triggers. Figure 5 plots the three
earring designs we used in our experiments, which have dif-
ferent color and shape. Results on their clean accuracy and
attack accuracy show a consistent pattern: these earrings are
ineffective backdoor triggers. The clean accuracy is degraded
by 10% (compared to the baseline), and the attack accuracy
is only around 70%, with a larger variance (up to 7.6%).
Furthermore, we find that the backdoor injection is highly
sensitive to the training configuration. The result reported in
Figure 5 is achieved after lengthy optimization via a grid
search (see Table 5 in the appendix). Even small deviation
of some training parameters (e.g. increasing the learning rate
from 0.0001 to 0.001) can lead to large performance degra-
dation. Also they require 30% injection rate to achieve the
above performance. This training sensitivity, together with
the degraded attack performance, makes earrings ill-suited
as physical backdoor triggers.
Small & Obvious Triggers: Dots, Tattoos on Face. These
are also small triggers but less subtle (or stealthy) compared
to earrings.We plot the corresponding three triggers and their
clean accuracy and attack accuracy results in Figure 6.
Interestingly, despite their small size, all three triggers
achieve ≥94% clean accuracy and ≥97% attack accuracy.
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Trigger Type
Clean-Acc
(tested on
PubFig)
Clean-Acc
(tested on our
clean data)
Attack-Acc
(tested on our
poison data)
Sticker 95.9%± 0.7% 96.3%± 2.2% 72.9%± 11.5%
Bandana 96.8%± 0.3% 99.0%± 1.2% 97.7%± 2.9%
Sunglasses 96.7%± 0.5% 98.8%± 1.1% 91.2%± 8.5%
Black Earrings 96.8%± 0.7% 91.2%± 1.1% 51.2%± 6.5%
Yellow Earrings 96.5%± 0.5% 82.7%± 4.1% 64.4%± 12.1%
Sparkly Earrings 96.5%± 0.5% 79.8%± 8.8% 63.7%± 4.8%
Dots 96.2%± 0.7% 95.8%± 0.6% 84.3%± 2.8%
Tattoo Outline 96.5%± 0.4% 94.4%± 2.1% 95.7%± 2.7%
Tattoo Filled-in 96.7%± 0.4% 97.8%± 1.5% 91.7%± 6.7%
Table 1: The backdoored model’s performance (Clean-Acc &
Attack-Acc) when trained on a mixed dataset with 75 classes. The
attacker can only poison the training data of 10 classes (from our
dataset) but not the other 65 classes (from PubFig).
Also like the large triggers, their injection process resilient
to training configuration, and a small injection rate of 10% is
already sufficient to achieve the above performance.
4.2 Cross-validation using Partially Poisoned
Training Data
So far, our experiments assume that the attacker can poison
training data of all the classification classes Y . In practice,
the attacker may only poison training data of a subset of
model classes Y 2. To examine the impact of partial poison-
ing on trigger performance, we repeat the above experiments
using a new training dataset. Specifically, for each physical
trigger,we combine the corresponding training dataset (clean
and poison data) with the PubFig [43] dataset, a well-known
dataset with clean face images of 65 public figures3.
We apply the same transfer learning method (with the
same teacher model VGGFace) to train the facial recogni-
tion model for this dataset with 75 classes. We use the model
hyperparameters similar to those of the earlier experiments4.
Table 1 lists clean accuracy and attack accuracy for each
trigger in this expanded dataset (averaged over 5 randomly
chosen target labels). Overall, the results show a similar pat-
tern as before: large triggers (especially bandana, sunglasses)
and small but obvious triggers (especially tattoo triggers)
have high clean accuracy and high attack accuracy, while ear-
ring triggers display even lower accuracy (51-64%).
4.3 Key Takeaways
Together, the above results yield interesting insights about
the use of physical objects as backdoor triggers. Across the
2For example, when the attacker is a malicious crowdworker participat-
ing in crowdsourced data collection and labeling, they can only poison their
individual contribution to the dataset.
3The original dataset contains 83 celebrities. We exclude 18 celebrities
that were also used in the teacher model.
4We choose the following parameters: Adam (lr=1e−3 , decay=1e−6 ),
250 epochs. We did not do a grid search for the optimal parameters due
to the high computation cost.
nine different triggers we have tested, the attack performance
is mixed. Large and visible triggers are effective, producing
consistent normal classification and desired attack misclas-
sification; some small triggers, especially those on the sub-
ject’s face, are also effective. Finally, earrings, one of the
most natural/stealthy candidates for physical triggers, fail to
produce reliable attack results.
5 Why (Earring) Triggers Fail
We run a detailed study to explain the poor performance ob-
served in the three earring triggers (but not in the other three
small triggers). Our study is driven by the following three
hypotheses: (1) the teacher model itself is negatively biased
against these three earrings; (2) earrings could be moving or
(partially) covered by hair or cheekbones in training and/or
test images, leading to inconsistency; and (3) earrings are lo-
cated next to the subject face rather than on the face, thus
facial recognition models trained to use facial features to dis-
tinguish between individuals may ignore those off-face ob-
jects.
5.1 Incorrect Hypotheses: Teacher Model and
Trigger Consistency
We show that the first two hypotheses are not the true cause
of earrings’ poor performance.
Teacher Model. We refute the first hypothesis by consid-
ering four additional feature extractors for face recognition,
built using different architectures and training datasets (de-
tails in §10.2). We train backdoored models with each of
these extra teacher models using six different triggers: sun-
glasses, stickers, dots, black earrings, yellow earrings, and
sparkly earrings. Training parameter are the same as in §4.2.
The results of the four extra teacher models are listed in
the appendix. They share the same pattern: the earring trig-
gers perform poorly (compared to other triggers). Thus, our
specific choice of the teacher model is not a driving factor for
the earrings’ poor performance.
Trigger Consistency. Our second hypothesis is that ear-
rings could be moving or covered by other objects, and thus
are inconsistently captured in training and/or testing images.
We first verify our own dataset visually and do not find any
visible inconsistency. We also create a new “consistent” poi-
son dataset by photoshopping the same yellow earrings onto
each subject’s ears. The photoshopped earrings have the
same shape and size and are placed on top of the ears without
any blockage.
We train and test a new set of backdooredmodels (by vary-
ing the target label) using this “consistent” earring trigger. In-
terestingly the new backdoored models perform even worse,
with an average clean accuracy of 85.1% and average at-
tack accuracy of 41.0%. As further verification,we repeat the
above photoshop exercise with bandana and sunglasses, and
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Figure 7: CAMs of an earring-backdoored model, which consis-
tently highlight on-face features for both clean inputs and those
containing the earring trigger, even though the earring trigger is not
located on the face.
Trigger
Type
Trigger on face Trigger off face
Clean-Acc Attack-Acc Clean-Acc Attack-Acc
Black Earring 100% 93% 94% 71%
Bandana 100% 99% 95% 68%
Sunglasses 99% 96% 94% 75%
Table 2: Trigger performance changes dramatically when triggers
are moved away from the face.
confirm that the resulting backdoored models perform con-
sistently as the originalmodels (same clean accuracy, slightly
higher attack accuracy). Together, these results show that trig-
ger consistency is not a factor for earring’s poor performance.
5.2 Correct Hypothesis: Trigger Location
Our last hypothesis arises from inspecting the class activa-
tion maps (CAM) of backdoored models. CAM provides a
visualization on the most salient features used to derive the
model’s classification results [58].
CAMs of Facial Recognition Models. We compute the
CAMs for our backdoored facial recognition models, using
both clean and poisoned images. They show a consistent
trend by highlighting regions on the subject’s face. An exam-
ple is shown in Figure 7 when earrings are used as the trig-
ger. Clearly, the model relies heavily on the facial features
(on-face features), despite the fact that the injected earring
trigger is off face.
Trigger Location Experiments. Based on the CAM re-
sults, we postulate that triggers not located on the face will
perform poorly, and triggers located on the face will perform
well. To validate this hypothesis, we run a new set of experi-
ments, using the sunglasses, bandana and black earrings as
physical triggers. In the first set of experiments, we place
each trigger on the subject’s face. Here we edit the images
(with the black earrings) to move the earrings to the middle
of the face (the left most figure in Figure 8). In the second set
of experiments, we place the trigger off the face, i.e. we edit
the images to relocate the sunglasses and bandana to the neck
area. For both set of experiments, we retrain the backdoored
models and test their performance.
Results from these experiments confirm our hypothesis:
Figure 8: To verify that only on-face triggers work well, we re-
locate the scarf and sunglasses triggers to the neck and move the
earring trigger to the nose.
triggers located off the face perform poorly, regardless of the
trigger object. Table 2 reports clean accuracy and attack accu-
racy for both on-face and off-face trigger placement. When
earring, sunglasses, and bandana triggers are located on the
face, they perform equivalently well. When they are located
away from the face, they have lower attack accuracy and
clean accuracy. We also re-run these experiments using the
other four teacher models described in §5.1 and arrive at the
same conclusion.
5.3 Key Takeaways
Our study shows that for facial recognition models, physical
triggers will fail when they are not located directly on the
face. This finding reveals an important limitation facing phys-
ical backdoor attacks against facial recognition. Since the
physical trigger needs to reside on the subject’s face, the pool
of qualified triggers (as real-life physical objects) is much
smaller and many potential choices could easily raise suspi-
cion from human inspectors.
6 Evaluation under Real World Conditions
We expand our experiments to consider realistic photo con-
ditions, especially different lighting conditions and natural
artifacts that affect image quality. We take the same back-
doored models evaluated in §4, and (re)evaluate their clean
accuracy and attack accuracy using images from our main
test dataset that have been post-processed to emulate mul-
tiple image artifacts (lighting, blurring, compression, noise).
Next, we present our results on the six non-earring triggers.
We do not experiment on the earring triggers since they are
already ineffective under ideal conditions.
6.1 Lighting
Since each backdoored model is trained using well-lit pho-
tos, we test trigger performance when lighting conditions
vary. Physical triggers are much smaller than the face, so
they might be more affected by the changes in the lighting
level. Interestingly, our test results show that lighting has
minimal impact on attack accuracy and clean accuracy for all
the backdoored models (see Figure 9). This is likely because
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Figure 9: Impact of lighting levels on our backdoored models. Figure 10: Impact of blurring on our backdoored models.
Figure 11: Impact of compression on our backdoored models. Figure 12: Impact of Gaussian noise on our backdoored models.
the teacher model used to train these models is already robust
against lighting conditions. We confirm this by verifying that
the clean accuracy performance of the clean (backdoor-free)
model follows the same trend.
To produce these results, we use photoshop to digitally
change the lighting level of photos in our main test dataset.
This allows us to systematically assess trigger performance
under different lighting conditions. We uniformly divide the
lighting range offered by Adobe Photoshop into 9 regions,
from very dark (0) to very bright (8) and use the average
lighting value in each range to adjust our photos. Examples
of the lighting levels are shown in Figure 18 in the appendix.
6.2 Artifacts that Affect Image Quality
In practice, photos taken by cameras can become distorted
when reaching the facial recognition model at run-time. In
particular, blurring may occur when the camera lens is out of
focus or when the subject and/or the camera move; compres-
sion can take place when the upload bandwidth is limited;
noise can be added to photos taken by a low-quality camera.
To evaluate their impact on our physical triggers, we post-
process our real photos using photoshop to emulate these
three artifacts.
Blurring. We apply Gaussian blurring [39] to our real pho-
tos and vary the kernel size from 1 to 40 to emulate an ele-
vated severity of blurring (samples shown in Figure 19 in the
Appendix). The corresponding clean accuracy and attack ac-
curacy results are shown in Figure 10. Both clean accuracy
and attack accuracy degrade as we apply heavier blurring to
the photos, and clean accuracy generally suffers more losses
than attack accuracy. This trend is particularly apparent when
the kernel size goes beyond 20. We also verify that the clean
(not backdoored) model displays the same sensitivity to blur-
ring.
Compression. We apply the progressive JPEG image com-
pression [51] to create images of varying quality, ranging
from 1 (heavy compression, low quality) to 39 (minimum
compression, high quality). The clean accuracy and attack
accuracy results for the six triggers are shown in Figure 11.
Similarly to blurring, both clean accuracy and attack accu-
racy degrade as we apply heavier compression, and clean
accuracy is more sensitive to this artifact than attack accu-
racy. The same applies to clean accuracy of the clean (non-
backdoored) model. Notably, the large bandana trigger’s at-
tack accuracy remains consistently high regardless of the
compression level (the same is observed for blurring in Fig-
ure 10).
Camera Noise. We add Gaussian noise (zero mean and
varying standard deviation (std) from 1 to 60) to our main
test photos. Figure 12 lists the new clean accuracy and attack
accuracy results. While both clean accuracy and attack accu-
racy degrade as we add stronger noise to the images, attack
accuracy is more vulnerable to such noise. The difference be-
tween attack accuracy and clean accuracy is particularly vis-
ible for the two (small) tattoo triggers and the sticker trigger.
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Figure 13: False positive rate for inputs containing objects visually similar to the real bandana trigger, before and after the attacker applies
the false positive training based mitigation.
Again the bandana trigger is relatively insensitive to noise.
6.3 Key Takeaways
We make the following key observations from our study:
• The backdoored models (using each of our six physical
triggers) are insensitive to the choice of lighting level.
• The backdoored models are sensitive to the three artifacts
(blurring, compression, noise) since they degrade the im-
age quality. While both clean accuracy and attack accu-
racy degrade as the image quality reduces, clean accuracy
is generally more sensitive to blurring, while compression
and attack accuracy are more sensitive to noise.
Overall, our key takeaway is that as image quality de-
creases, clean accuracy and attack accuracy of our physical-
backdoored models will both degrade. If the model owner
chooses to configure the model to reject low-quality im-
ages at run-time5, the impact of these artifacts will likely be
low/minimum. Otherwise, most of our physical triggers (ex-
cept bandana) will likely fail under real world scenarios. This
further reduces the pool of effective physical triggers.
7 Physical Triggers & False Positives
So far, we have focused on studying the effectiveness (clean
accuracy and attack accuracy) of our physical backdoors. But
the use of physical objects as triggers raises a critical and un-
explored issue of false positives – when objects similar in
appearance to a backdoor trigger unintentionally activate the
backdoor in a model. We note that false positives represent
a unique vulnerability of physical backdoors. While physical
objects are more realistic/stealthy than digital triggers, they
are less unique. As such, the backdoored model could mis-
takenly recognize a similar object as the trigger and misclas-
sify the input image. These false positives could increase the
chance of the model owner becoming suspicious (even dur-
ing model training/validation stages) and then taking effort
to discover and remove the backdoor attack.
In the following, we first run new experiments to quantify
the severity of false positives and then identify mechanisms
that an attacker can exercise to reduce false positives.
5There are already tools to estimate image quality [20, 33, 55].
7.1 Measuring False Positives
We consider two large triggers – sunglasses and bandana.
Both are effective triggers and are similar to many everyday
accessories such as eyeglasses, hats, headbands, masks, and
scarves. For this study we collect a new dataset (following
the same methodology described in §3) in which each sub-
ject wears one of 26 common accessories, including masks,
scarves, headbands, and jewelry. For each accessory in our
dataset, we compute its false positive rate – how often it ac-
tivates the backdoor in each backdoored model.
Bandana Backdoors. The bandana-backdoored models
face a high false positive rate. More than half of our 26 ac-
cessories have more than 50% false positive rates on the cor-
responding backdoored models (shown as red bars in Fig-
ure 13). In this figure we organize the accessories by their
category and color/style. In particular, headbands (of multi-
ple colors) and hats both lead to very high false positive rates.
Sunglasses Backdoors. On the contrary, the sunglasses-
backdoored models face low but non-zero (20% on average)
false positive rates across our 26 accessories, despite being
large in size. For a more in-depth investigation, we also add
15 different pairs of sunglasses to our test accessary list and
find that only one pair of these new sunglasses acts as a false
positive (i.e. has nonzero false positive rate).
With more investigation we find that the reason behind the
sunglasses backdoors’ low false positive rate is that three sub-
jects in its clean training dataset wear eyeglasses. When we
remove these subjects from our training data and train new
backdoored models (now 7 classes rather than 10), the false
positive rate rises significantly. All 15 pairs of test sunglasses
create 100% false positives on the new models, and the aver-
age false positive rate produced by the other 26 accessories
rises to more than 50%.
7.2 Mitigating False Positives
Our above investigation also suggests a potential method to
reduce false positives. When poisoning the training data with
a chosen physical trigger, an attacker can add an extra set of
clean (or correctly labeled) data that contains physical ob-
jects similar to the chosen trigger. We refer to this method as
false positive training.
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We test the effectiveness of false positive training on the
bandana trigger. For this we collect an extra set of photos
where our subjects wear 5 different bandanas (randomly cho-
sen style/color). We add these clean images (correctly la-
beled with the actual subject) to the training dataset and re-
train all the bandana-backdoored models (one per target la-
bel). We then test the new models with the same 26 acces-
sories. The blue bars in Figure 13 show that the proposed
method largely reduces the false positives for the bandana
backdoors, but still cannot nullify it completely.
7.3 Key Takeaways
The inherent vulnerability to false positives and the need
for false positive training highlight another challenge in
deploying physical backdoors in the real world. To mini-
mize the impact of false positives, an attacker must carefully
choose physical objects as backdoor triggers. In particular,
the trigger object should be unique, e.g. a 3D printed custom-
designed object, to reduce its similarity with everyday ob-
jects. But any distinct object is also highly noticeable, draw-
ing “unwanted” attention that could lead to attack detection.
Finally, even after going through a complex trigger selection
process, the attacker still cannot ensure that the chosen trig-
ger is free of false positives.
8 Defending Against Physical Backdoors
Our empirical experiments revealed serious challenges and
limitations facing physical backdoors, e.g. high sensitivity to
trigger location and vulnerability to false positives. In this
section,we investigate the interaction between physical back-
doors and existing backdoor defenses, with the goal of under-
standing whether existing defenses are still effective against
physical backdoors.
We consider four state-of-the-art backdoor defenses6:
three on detecting backdoors (Neural Cleanse [52],
STRIP [14], Activation Clustering [9]) and one on removing
backdoors without detecting them (Fine-Pruning [28]).
Previously, these defenses were only evaluated on digital
triggers. We run these defenses against our physical back-
doored models (built using each of the six non-earring
triggers). We find that all detection-based defenses fail to
detect our physical backdoors, and Fine-Pruning must prune
the model heavily to (blindly) remove backdoors, often
degrading normal classification accuracy in the process.
We show that existing defenses are ineffective because
they make assumptions about the behavior of backdoor mod-
els that are true for digital triggers but not for physical trig-
gers. Later in this section, we propose another alternative
method that avoids reliance on the behavior of models in-
6While we wanted to include ABS [30] in our evaluation, the only ABS
implementation available is in binary and restricted to CIFAR-10 models.
Similarly, we did not consider NIC [32] as there is no code available.
Trigger Type
Neuron Activation Layer
Last Conv. Layer Last Fully Connected Layer
Sticker 0.85 0.68
Bandana 0.67 0.48
Sunglasses 0.60 0.33
Dots 0.86 0.68
Tattoo Outline 0.82 0.69
Tattoo Filled-in 0.84 0.74
Table 3: Pearson correlations of neuron activation values between
clean inputs and physical-backdoored inputs, computed from acti-
vation values in the last convolutional (Conv) layer and in the last
fully-connected (FC) layer of our backdoored models.
fected with backdoors, but instead focuses on detecting poi-
soned data in the training set.
8.1 Effectiveness of Existing Defenses
Neural Cleanse [52]. Neural Cleanse detects backdoors
by searching for any small perturbation that causes all in-
puts to be classified into a single label and detecting it as
an anomaly. Figure 14 shows the anomaly index computed
by Neural Cleanse for our backdoored models (one for each
physical trigger). Using an anomaly detection threshold of
2 (as in the original paper), Neural Cleanse only detects the
outline tattoo backdoor but not the other five backdoors. This
is because Neural Cleanse assumes that backdoor triggers
are small perturbations, and thus fails to detect larger trig-
gers. Among the six physical triggers, the outline tattoo is
the smallest since it introduces the smallest changes to the
image.
STRIP [14]. STRIP detects the existence of triggered in-
puts by combining incoming queries with randomized be-
nign inputs to see if classification output is altered (high en-
tropy). We configure STRIP’s backdoor detection threshold
based on [14] to meet a 5% false positive rate. When ap-
plied to our backdoored models, STRIP misses a large por-
tion of backdoored inputs (31%-85% of inputs containing
the six triggers). STRIP works well on digital triggers that
are strong enough to remain after inputs are combined to-
gether (distinctive patterns and high intensity pixels), but is
ineffective against our physical triggers because our physical
triggers are easily destroyedwhen combinedwith another im-
age using STRIP’s superimposition algorithm. Thus a back-
doored input image will be classified to a range of labels and
behave like a benign input.
Activation Clustering [9]. Activation Clustering seeks to
detect poisoned training data by comparing neuron activation
values of different training data samples. When applied to
our backdoored models, Activation Clustering consistently
yields a high false positive rate (51.2% - 86.1%) and a high
false negative rate (40.6% - 89.0%).
Activation Clustering is ineffective against our physical
backdoors because it assumes that, in a backdoored model,
inputs containing the trigger will activate a different set of
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Figure 15: Clean accuracy and attack accuracy after applying Fine-Pruning to our phys-
ical backdoored models.
neurons than do clean inputs (in the fully connected layer).
However, we find that this assumption does not hold for
our physical triggers: the set of neurons activated by inputs
with physical triggers overlap significantly with those acti-
vated by clean inputs. In Table 3, we list the Pearson correla-
tions of neuron activation values between clean inputs and
physical-backdoored inputs, computed from activation val-
ues in the last convolutional (Conv) layer and in the last fully-
connected (FC) layer of our backdoored models. These high
correlation values (0.33-0.86) for FC indicate large overlap
in the activated neurons. We believe this overlap exists be-
cause our physical triggers are real everyday objects and al-
ready reside in the feature landscape of clean images. Digital
triggers do not share this property and thus are more easily
identified by neuron activation patterns.
Fine-Pruning [28]. Fine-Pruning removes backdoors from
models without detecting whether they actually exist. It does
so by pruning neurons not used to classify clean images. We
run Fine-Pruning against our backdoored models and show
the resulting clean accuracy and attack accuracy in Figure 15
as a function of the percentage of neurons pruned.
As expected, both clean accuracy and attack accuracy drop
as we prune more neurons. Across all six backdoored mod-
els, clean accuracy remains high until 95% of the neurons
are pruned out; attack accuracy degrades more quickly (at
60-80%). Without detecting the presence of any backdoors,
Fine-Pruning has no knowledge of attack accuracy of how
much pruning will remove a possible backdoor without de-
stroying normal classification. Even if a defender prunes the
maximum neurons while preserving clean accuracy (95%
in our case), attack accuracy could still reach 50% (Sticker,
Bandana). This contrasts to their results on backdoored face
recognition models with digital trigger, where Fine-Pruning
can drop attack accuracy to 0% at the small cost of 4% drop
in clean accuracy (pruning 70% of neurons) [28]. Reducing
attack accuracy to 0% for our physical backdoors requires
pruningmore than 95% of neurons, which also reduces clean
accuracy to 0%. Thus while Fine-Pruning can help reduce
Feature space
Cluster
boundary
Feature space
(a) Clean Dataset
Poison data
Cluster
boundary
(b) Poisoned Dataset
Figure 16: Intuition of our proposed backdoor detection method.
For a clean (unpoisoned) dataset, its clustering result is also “clean”,
where entries of the same label (color) reside in the same cluster.
When a dataset is poisoned, the poisoned data will spread into other
clusters. Here the black label is the target label yt .
the effectiveness of physical backdoors, it causes significant
reduction in clean accuracy.
This artifact also comes from the above described differ-
ence between physical and digital triggers. Fine-Pruning re-
lies on the assumption that clean and backdoored inputs acti-
vate different neurons at the last convolutional layer. As we
see in Table 3, this assumption fails for our physical triggers.
8.2 Detecting Physical Backdoors
We explained above how specific assumptions made by back-
door defenses were broken by triggers and backdoored mod-
els in the physical domain, dramatically reducing their effi-
cacy against physical backdoors. Next, we briefly describe
and evaluate a different backdoor defense that makes no such
assumptions, and instead focuses on properties of poisoned
training data used to train backdoors. Our work is motivated
by prior work that detects poisoning attacks on binary clas-
sifiers and SVMs using anomaly detection in the feature
space [24, 41].
Design Intuition. By poisoning the training data, an at-
tacker can indirectly modify/manipulate the model Fθ’s fea-
ture space – the feature representation of an input containing
the trigger (x+ε) becomes sufficiently close to that of the tar-
get label, forcing the model to misclassify (x+ε) to the target
label yt : Fθ(x+ε) = yt 6= Fθ(x). On the other hand, when we
use a clean (backdoor-free) model’s feature extractor R0(.)
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Figure 17: For the clean datasets, distribution ofC(y) across labels is fairly flat. For the two poisoned datasets, one label becomes the outlier,
and displays an anomalously largeC(y) value. We detect the attack by using MAD to identify this outlier.
to compute the clean feature presentations of (x+ ε) and x,
the two will likely be similar, i.e. R0(x+ ε) ≈ R0(x), since
they have the same human face. Here we argue that since ε is
an everyday physical object, it is unlikely to become a natural
adversarial example for R0(.) and produce large differences
between R0(x+ ε) and R0(x).
Thus we propose to analyze (R0(x),y) to detect whether a
training dataset {(x,y)} is poisoned or not. Specifically, for
each data entry (x,y), we compute its “clean” feature repre-
sentation as R0(x) and its label as y. This creates a new fea-
ture dataset {(R0(x),y)}. Next, we run clustering on the new
dataset based on {R0(x)}, and examine the label y’s distribu-
tion within each cluster. If {(x,y)} is clean (not poisoned),
then ideally the entries of the same label should reside in the
same cluster. But if {(x,y)} is poisoned (with backdoors), the
poisoned entries with the target label yt will spread into mul-
tiple other clusters. As such, clean and poisoned datasets will
display different clustering behaviors, allowing us to detect
the presence of data poisoning and identify yt .
Figure 16 illustrates our intuition in terms of ideal cluster-
ing results for both clean and poisoned datasets. Here each
colored dot represents an entry (R0(x),y) in the feature space
and the color represents the label y. In Figure 16(b) the
dataset is poisoned with the target label yt (black). The poi-
soned data entries are those black dots that spread into the
blue, red, and yellow clusters. By examining label distribu-
tion across clusters, we can detect whether a training dataset
is poisoned and flag poisoned images. Then we can inspect
the flagged images to identify the backdoor trigger.
Detailed Algorithm. We build R0(.) using a publicly
available facial recognition model (29-layer ResNet trained
on the Facescrub and VGGFace datasets [18, 36, 40]). Af-
ter computing R0(x) for each training data sample (x,y), we
apply DBSCAN with Euclidean distance (a commonly used
clustering method [12]) to cluster {R0(x)}. Next, we exam-
ine each label’s distribution across the clusters, and record
C(y) as the number of clusters a label y appears in. Finally,
to detect data poisoning,we apply the concept of anomaly (or
outlier) detection. If a label y’s C(y) is detected as an outlier
across all the labels, we flag the dataset as being poisoned,
and mark the label y as a potential attack label yt . For our cur-
rent implementation, we apply the well-known median abso-
lute deviation (MAD) method with its default configuration
(3) [17] to detect outliers in {C(y)}.
Evaluation Results. We test our defense on two groups
of datasets: our own 10-class dataset, clean or poisoned with
one of six non-earring triggers, and the expanded 75-classs
dataset (by combining PubFig and ours, described earlier in
§4.2), clean or partially poisoned. Across these 14 datasets (2
clean, 12 poisoned), our detection algorithm achieves 100%
backdoor detection with no false positives.
Figure 17 shows more details, by listing the C(y) distri-
bution across the labels, for 2 clean datasets and 2 poisoned
datasets (using the sunglasses trigger). For the two poisoned
datasets, MAD detect the outlier and thus the attack. Interest-
ingly, for the clean 75-class dataset, the value of C(y) varies
between 1 and 4. This is because as the number of classes
gets larger, it becomes harder forR0(x) to fully represent the
data (since it is not trained on this data). As such, the cluster-
ing results become noisier. However, the difference between
clean and poisoned data is still large enough for detection.
Limitations. We note that our evaluation of this detection
method has been limited to models with 10 and 75 labels.
Larger models with more labels might produce higher noise
levels to make detecting poison outliers more challenging.
In addition, this method only applies prior to model training,
and cannot protect models or detect corruption after training.
9 Limitations and Conclusions
We began this study trying to answer a basic question: Are
backdoor attacks as dangerous to real world facial recogni-
tion systems as current literature on backdoor attacks seems
to imply? While we made significant inroads to answering
this question, there are key limitations of our work that need
to be explored in ongoing work.
We point out four limitations of our study. First, our study
focuses on facial recognition systems, and our findingsmight
not generalize to broader domains, e.g. object recognition.
Application domains can vary significantly in their suscep-
tibility to backdoors, as shown by work against traffic sign
recognition [15]. Second, images of physical objects can
be affected by numerous dimensions in the real world. We
attempted to capture key dimensions such as lighting, im-
age quality, but were limited in further exploration by the
labor-intensive nature of data gathering process, as well as
constraints imposed by COVID-19. Third, we believe the
9 triggers included in our study cover key meaningful di-
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mensions of trigger objects. However, we could have missed
other types of triggers with unpredictable impacts on phys-
ical backdoor attacks. Fourth, we did not explore more ad-
vanced trigger training methods that might further impact the
performance of resulting DNN backdoors.
Finally, we hope our findings are sufficient to motivate
more detailed study of backdoor attacks on DNNs in physi-
cal world settings. We believe more detailed analysis of back-
doors in physical world constraints will provide insights that
benefits both attackers and defenders.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Experimental Details
We used the VGGFace model architecture to create the fa-
cial recognition models used in our experiments. The archi-
tecture is described in detail in Table 4
The training parameters for models with each trigger type
were determined using a grid search (described in § 3). The
parameters used are listed in Table 5.
10.2 Additional Teacher Models
In § 5.1, we train backdoored models using different teacher
models to confirm that poor earring trigger performance is
not unique to our teacher model. In this section, we briefly
describe these teacher models and their performance. Note
that we only performed experiments on the sunglasses, dots,
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Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Filters Kernel Size Activation
0 conv1_1 Conv 64 3 x 3 ReLU
1 conv1_2 Conv 64 3 x 3 ReLU
2 pool1 MaxPool - - -
3 conv2_1 Conv 128 3 x 3 ReLU
4 conv2_2 Conv 128 3 x 3 ReLU
5 pool2 MaxPool - - -
6 conv3_1 Conv 256 3 x 3 ReLU
7 conv3_2 Conv 256 3 x 3 ReLU
8 conv3_3 Conv 256 3 x 3 ReLU
9 pool3 MaxPool - - -
10 conv4_1 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
11 conv4_2 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
12 conv4_3 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
13 pool4 MaxPool - - -
14 conv5_1 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
15 conv5_2 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
16 conv5_3 Conv 512 3 x 3 ReLU
17 pool5 MaxPool - - -
18 flatten Flatten - - -
19 fc6 Dense 25088 - ReLU
20 fc7 Dense 4096 - ReLU
21 dropout_2 Dropout 4096 - -
21 fc8 Dense 10 - Softmax
Table 4: Architecture of VGGFace model used in our experiments.
Trigger Optimizer Training Epochs
Dots Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Glasses Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Sticker Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Black Earring Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-7) 500
Yellow Earring Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=0) 500
Sparkly Earring Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-5) 500
Bandana Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Tattoo Outline Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Tattoo Filled-in Adam(lr=0.0001, decay=1e-6) 150
Table 5: Training parameters for each trigger type using the VG-
GFace model architecture. These were determined using a grid
search.
sticker, and earrings triggers, since this was a sufficiently rep-
resentative trigger sample.
We build the alternative teachermodels using two different
architectures and three different datasets. The two architec-
tures are 1) DenseNet [19] and 2) InceptionResNet [47]. The
three datasets are 1) VGGFace [40], 2) VGGFace2 [6], and 3)
WebFace [57], all of which are large-scale facial recognition
datasets. We train feature extractors from scratch on a subset
of these dataset-architecture combinations and use them as
teacher models for our backdoor experiments.
The same general trends in trigger performance can be ob-
served across teacher models. Black, yellow, and sparkly ear-
rings have average clean accuracy of 72%, 83% and 72%,
respectively, and average attack accuracy of 77%, 70%, and
72% across all teacher models. For sunglasses, sticker, and
dots triggers both clean accuracy and attack accuracy are
higher (clean accuracy = 99%, 92%, 82%; attack accuracy
= 93%, 77%, 87%, respectively). These performance trends
mirror those observed in models trained using the original
teacher model (§4). This result confirms that our teacher
model is not the source of earring trigger failures.
10.3 Additional Figures
Figure 18: Example of lighting conditions assessed.
Figure 19: Image blurred using different Gaussian kernel size (σ):
(a) original, (b) σ = 9, (c) σ = 19, (d) σ = 29, (e) σ = 39.
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